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INSIDER TRADING LAW THAT WORKS: USING 
NEWMAN AND SALMAN TO UPDATE DIRKS’S 
PERSONAL BENEFIT STANDARD 
Mark Hayden Adams 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Wall Street corruption, particularly insider trading, has captured 
the imagination of the American public since the 1980s.1 While the 
most egregious cases of insider trading often grab headlines,2 there is 
confusion and disagreement about exactly what constitutes illegal 
insider trading.3 Imagine this: a prosecutor has solid evidence that an 
investment banker tipped inside information4 to his brother, who, in 
turn tipped his brother-in-law, who traded on the information and 
pocketed a cool $1.7 million.5 In addition, the evidence shows that 
 
  J.D. Candidate, May 2017, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; M.F.A., University of 
Delaware, Professional Theatre Training Program; B.M., Indiana University, Jacobs School of 
Music. I would like to thank Professor Elizabeth Pollman for her guidance and insight and the 
editorial staff of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review for their diligence, particularly Kristin 
Haule and Lilian Walden. I would also like to acknowledge my wife Stefania Vitali-Adams and 
my children Kyler and Gemma for their unwavering support and encouragement. 
 1. Hollywood studios produced a string of popular movies based on Wall Street 
manipulations starting in the 1980s, including most notably Wall Street (1987) (insider trading), 
but also Trading Places (1983) (commodities future trading), Working Girl (1988) (mergers and 
acquisitions), Other People’s Money (1991) (corporate takeover), Barbarians at the Gate (1993) 
(leveraged buyout), Boiler Room (2000) (securities fraud), Margin Call (2007) (financial 
recklessness), and coming back full circle to Wall Street: Money Never Sleeps (2011) (moral 
hazard). Usman Hayat, Top 20 Films About Finance: From Crisis to Con Men, CFA INST. 
(Sept. 20, 2013), https://blogs.cfainstitute.org/investor/2013/09/20/20-finance-films-for 
-entertainment-and-education. 
 2. See, e.g., Anita Raghavan, Lust for Zeros, N.Y. TIMES MAG., May 17, 2013, at MM30 
(discussing United States v. Gupta, 747 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1841 
(2015)). 
 3. See, e.g., Sung Hui Kim, Insider Trading as Private Corruption, 61 UCLA L. REV. 928 
(2014) (“Deep confusion reigns over federal insider trading law, even over the essential elements 
of an insider trading violation.”). 
 4. While it is often referred to simply as “inside information,” the accurate term is “material 
nonpublic information” and courts often examine whether the information tipped was indeed 
“material.” See, e.g., SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848–51 (2d Cir. 1968) (en 
banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). 
 5. United States v. Salman, 792 F.3d 1087, 1088–89 (9th Cir. 2015). 
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all parties were fully aware that the activity was illegal.6 The brother-
in-law even tried to hide the trades in a friend’s account.7 The 
prosecutor handily wins the case, but the defendant appeals all the 
way to the Supreme Court, claiming to be innocent because the 
government did not prove that the investment banker received a 
pecuniary benefit when he tipped his brother and that the defendant 
knew of such a benefit.8 To many laypersons, this may sound like 
further proof that “the law is an ass.”9 
Unlike many other countries, the United States has no federal 
statute defining and prohibiting insider trading.10 Instead, insider-
trading prohibitions have been developed through common law 
interpretations of Section 10(b) of the 1934 Exchange Act, and of 
SEC Rule 10b-5, one of the regulations issued pursuant to it, which 
was adopted in 1942.11 The results have been uneven, particularly in 
recent years.12 At issue lately has been the question of the “personal 
benefit” received by the insider who tips the information, also known 
as the “tipper.” (The person who receives the tip is known as the 
“tippee.”) The tipper’s personal benefit is a required element of a 
violation.13 
In 2012 in SEC v. Obus,14 the Second Circuit reversed a 
summary judgment order against the SEC, holding that evidence of a 
college friendship between the tipper and the tippee was a sufficient 
inference to send to the jury the question of whether the tipper 
received a personal benefit from the tip.15 But in 2014 in United 
 
 6. Id. at 1089. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. at 1090. 
 9. These words were uttered (more or less) by Mr. Bumble in Charles Dickens’s Oliver 
Twist. But the notion was not new to Dickensian characters. In 1654, the phrase “the law is such 
an ass” was found in Revenge for Honour, published by George Chapman, and possibly written 
by playwright Henry Glapthorne. The Law Is an Ass, PHRASE FINDER, http://www.phrases.org 
.uk/meanings/the-law-is-an-ass.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2016). 
 10. Richard W. Painter, Don’t Ask, Just Tell: Insider Trading After United States v. 
O’Hagan, 84 VA. L. REV. 153, 211–12 (1998). 
 11. Kim, supra note 3, at 935. The “SEC” is the commonly used acronym for the Securities 
and Exchange Commission. 
 12. Compare SEC v. Obus, 693 F.3d 276 (2d Cir. 2012) and United States v. Salman, 792 
F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2015), with United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 13. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983) (holding that the prohibition against insider trading is 
based on the insider’s breach of fiduciary duty in tipping the information, which generally 
includes some kind of personal benefit obtained by the insider/tipper). 
 14. 693 F.3d 276 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 15. Obus, 693 F.3d at 279. 
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States v. Newman,16 the Second Circuit seemed to reverse itself— 
although it did not state that it was doing so—by holding that a 
personal benefit cannot be inferred “by the mere fact of a 
friendship,” but must be established through “proof of a 
meaningfully close personal relationship that generates an exchange 
that is objective, consequential, and represents at least a potential 
gain of a pecuniary or similarly valuable nature.”17 In addition, the 
Newman Court held that the government must prove both that the 
tipper received a personal benefit and that the tippee knew that the 
tipper received the benefit.18 These requirements have made it much 
more difficult for prosecutors to bring cases forward and to win 
them.19 Consequently, the government petitioned the Second Circuit 
to review the case en banc, but was denied.20 Subsequently, the 
government petitioned the Supreme Court to review the case, but 
again, the Court denied the request.21 
In 2015, Judge Jed Rakoff of the Southern District of New York 
sat by designation on the Ninth Circuit in Salman, the case in which 
the insider tipped his brother, who tipped his brother-in-law.22 No 
longer bound by the Second Circuit’s decision in Newman, Judge 
Rakoff held that Newman did not intend to overturn the landmark 
Supreme Court insider trading case, Dirks v. SEC.23 Indeed, the 
Second Circuit was required to follow the Supreme Court, and 
therefore any interpretation of Newman must be in concert with 
Dirks.24 Dirks held that insider trading violations are based on the 
breach of fiduciary duty by the original tipper (the “insider”), and 
that this breach of duty is met where an “insider makes a gift of 
confidential information to a trading relative or friend.”25 Judge 
Rakoff therefore rejected Salman’s argument that the government 
needed to prove that the investment banker received a personal 
 
 16. 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 17. Newman, 773 F.3d at 452. 
 18. Id. at 453. 
 19. David I. Miller, Putting the Brakes on Newman: 3 Recent Rakoff Decisions, LAW360 
(July 30, 2015, 3:46 PM ET), http://www.law360.com/articles/684440/putting-the-brakes-on 
-newman-3-recent-rakoff-decisions. 
 20. Brief of Petitioner-Appellee at 1, United States v. Newman, No. 13-1837(L), 13-
1917(CON), 2015 WL 1064423 (2d Cir. Jan. 23, 2015). 
 21. United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 242 
(2015). 
 22. United States v. Salman, 792 F.3d 1087, 1088 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 23. Id. at 1093. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 1093 (quoting Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 664 (1983)). 
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benefit—it was enough that he tipped inside information to his 
brother as a gift.26 
After the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Newman, some 
commentators predicted that the Court would find Salman a better 
case to determine the issue of a personal benefit.27 In fact, in 2014 
Justice Scalia welcomed the opportunity to hear an insider trading 
case so that the Court could clarify this area of law.28 On January 19, 
2016, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear Salman.29 Less 
than one month later, on February 13, 2016, Justice Scalia died, and 
his absence will likely significantly change the dynamics of the 
Court and create an opportunity to revisit earlier holdings.30 The 
Court should take this opportunity to reverse Dirks’s holding that a 
personal benefit is required to show a breach of fiduciary duty.31 
While a personal benefit examination is often useful, by making it a 
required element, the Court made it too difficult for the judicial 
framework of insider trading to comport with congressional intent as 
expressed through the creation of the SEC.32 In addition, the Court 
should eliminate the Newman requirement that the tippee must have 
knowledge of the tipper’s personal benefit.33 There is much at stake 
in the Court’s upcoming decision. On one side, there is a world of 
Wall Street market analysts who routinely talk with corporate 
insiders to “ferret out” information about a company to determine the 
value of its stock.34 These analysts’ findings quickly filter down to 
traders, resulting in much more accurate pricing of securities.35 As 
such, they provide information that is integral to the proper 
 
 26. Id. at 1094. 
 27. Walter Pavlo, The Insider Trading Case the Supreme Court Wants to Hear, FORBES 
(Jan. 25, 2016, 9:24 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/walterpavlo/2016/01/25/the-insider- 
trading-case-the-supreme-court-wants-to-hear/#222220562788; Stephen Bainbridge, Insider 
Trading at the Supreme Court: With Newman Down, Will Salman Go?, 
PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (Oct. 9, 2015), 
http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2015/10/insider-trading-at-the 
-supreme-court-with-newman-down-will-salman-go.html. 
 28. Whitman v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 352, 354 (2014). 
 29. Ed Beeson, High Court Takes on Insider Trading Benefits Case, LAW360 (Jan. 19, 2016, 
10:18 AM ET), http://www.law360.com/articles/747762/high-court-takes-on-insider-trading 
-benefits-case. 
 30. Adam Liptak, Antonin Scalia, Justice on the Supreme Court, Dies at 79, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 13, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/14/us/antonin-scalia-death.html. 
 31. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 662 (1983). 
 32. See infra Part II. 
 33. Unites States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 449 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 34. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 658. 
 35. Id. at 658–59. 
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functioning of the market, and they need to be able to perform their 
work without fear of breaking the law.36 On the other side, the 
government must have tools to prosecute those, like Salman, who 
willfully trade on inside information. 
This Note proceeds as follows: Part II chronicles the 
development of insider trading law, from the Great Depression 
through today, including the policy issues that have guided both 
legislators and judges. Part III examines in detail the policy problems 
with recent judicial decisions, as well as the inherent conflict 
between the mission of the Securities Exchange Commission and the 
Supreme Court’s holding in Dirks. Part IV proposes solutions to the 
current problem with insider trading liability and demonstrates how 
the solutions would solve the problem. Part V justifies the proposal. 
Part VI concludes. 
II.  STATEMENT OF EXISTING LAW 
A.  Brief History of the Securities and Exchange Act 
After World War I, there was little appetite for a federal system 
of market regulation.37 The roaring ‘20s were full of promises of 
“rags to riches” transformations by investing in the stock market, and 
most investors failed to consider the systemic risk that came from 
widespread abuse of margin financing (investing borrowed money) 
and unreliable information about the securities in which they were 
investing.38 
When the stock market crashed in October 1929, however, 
public confidence in the markets crashed as well.39 Both large and 
small investors, and even the banks that had loaned to them, lost 
massive amounts of money in the Great Depression that followed.40 
For the economy to recover, the public would need renewed faith in 
the markets, and Congress held hearings in search of a solution.41 
Based on its findings, Congress passed the Securities Act of 1933 
and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”), which 
 
 36. Id. at 658; see also A.C. Pritchard, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., and the 
Counterrevolution in the Federal Securities Laws, 52 DUKE L.J. 841, 936 (2003). 
 37. What We Do, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/about 
/whatwedo.shtml (last modified June 10, 2013). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
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created the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”).42 The 
acts were intended to restore investor confidence in the capital 
markets by ensuring that investors would have access to reliable 
information and that there were clear rules of honest dealing.43 
Most insider trading prosecutions are based on violations of two 
laws: Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and SEC Rule 10b-5. In 
§ 10(b), Congress made it unlawful “[t]o use or employ in 
connection with the purchase or sale of any security . . . any 
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention” of 
rules promulgated by the SEC.44 In Rule 10b-5, the SEC made it 
unlawful to “engage in any act, practice, or course of business which 
operates . . . as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with 
the purchase or sale of any security.”45 Interestingly, although 
§ 10(b) was intended as a “catch-all” clause to prevent fraudulent 
practices, neither the statute nor the pursuant regulations expressly 
prohibits insider trading.46 
B.  The Seminal Insider Trading Cases 
1.  Straightforward Insider Trading: Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. in 1969 
The first insider trading case in modern judicial history, SEC v. 
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,47 was relatively simple.48 Corporate insiders 
knew the company had just discovered a huge deposit of copper, zinc 
and silver, but released a press statement that essentially denied it.49 
Secretly, they purchased stock and options in their company and sold 
it at a great profit after the news became public and the share price 
rose.50 The Second Circuit found that the insiders violated § 10(b) 
and SEC Rule 10b-5, noting that “[i]t was the intent of Congress that 
all members of the investing public should be subject to identical 
 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006). 
 45. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b–5(c) (2016). 
 46. Unites States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 445 (2d Cir. 2014) (citing Ernst & Ernst v. 
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 202–06 (1976)). 
 47. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). 
 48. SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 
U.S. 976 (1969). This is widely considered a seminal case, even though it is from the Second 
Circuit, not the Supreme Court. The Second Circuit handles a large portion of securities related 
cases because it covers New York City. 
 49. Id. at 845. 
 50. Id. at 847. 
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market risks.”51 Specifically, the court found that because the 
insiders had access to inside information, they “were not trading on 
an equal footing with the outside investors,” and Congress intended 
to prevent this kind of inequity.52 
By contrast, subsequent cases that have shaped the law of 
insider trading have dealt with situations that were far more 
complicated.53 More importantly, the idea that Congress intended 
that “all members of the investing public should be subject to 
identical market risks”54 was rejected in subsequent cases, most 
notably by Justice Powell in Chiarella v. United States.55 
2.  The Classical Theory: Chiarella in 1980 
The second major insider trading case was Chiarella v. United 
States, which established what became known as the “classical 
theory” of insider trading.56 Vincent Chiarella worked at a financial 
printer, where he handled documents announcing corporate takeover 
bids.57 Although the identities of the acquiring and target 
corporations were withheld until the last minute, often Chiarella was 
able to deduce them.58 Without disclosing his knowledge, he 
purchased stock in the companies and sold his shares immediately 
after the takeovers occurred, making a profit in excess of $30,000.59 
He was convicted of violating § 10(b) and SEC Rule 10b-5.60 The 
Second Circuit affirmed the conviction.61 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and began by examining 
the trial court’s jury instruction, which allowed a conviction if the 
 
 51. Id. at 852. 
 52. Id. 
 53. See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 224–25 (1980) (where the inside 
information was deduced by a man who worked at a Wall Street print shop); see also Dirks v. 
SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 648–49 (1983) (where the insider revealed information to a broker-dealer for 
the purpose of exposing corporate fraud). 
 54. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 851–52. 
 55. 445 U.S. at 232 (rejecting the Second Circuit’s reasoning that the federal securities laws 
“created a system providing equal access to information necessary for reasoned and intelligent 
investment decisions.”). 
 56. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651–52 (1997) (“Under the ‘traditional’ or 
‘classical theory’ of insider trading liability, § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 are violated when a corporate 
insider trades in the securities of his corporation on the basis of material, nonpublic 
information.”). 
 57. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 224. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 225. 
 61. Id. 
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jury found that Chiarella “willfully failed to inform sellers of target 
company securities that he knew of a forthcoming takeover bid that 
would make their shares more valuable.”62 The Court observed that 
§ 10(b) did not address whether silence may constitute a 
“manipulative or deceptive device.”63 
Next, the Court turned for guidance to an earlier influential case 
at the SEC, In re Cady, Roberts & Co.,64 where the SEC held that a 
broker-dealer’s duty to abstain from trading or disclosing the inside 
information arose from “(i) the existence of a relationship affording 
access to inside information intended to be available only for a 
corporate purpose, and (ii) the unfairness of allowing a corporate 
insider to take advantage of that information by trading without 
disclosure.”65 Under this test, Chiarella could not be held liable 
because neither the Second Circuit nor the trial court identified a 
fiduciary relationship between Chiarella and the sellers of the 
stock.66 Instead, the Court reasoned the SEC’s decision was based on 
the belief that federal securities laws have “created a system 
providing equal access to information necessary for reasoned and 
intelligent investment decisions,” and therefore, any trading using 
material nonpublic information was fraudulent.67 
The Court rejected the “equal access” theory, also known as the 
“fairness” theory.68 In fact, the Court held that to formulate such a 
broad duty would “depart radically” from the “established doctrine 
that duty arises from a specific relationship between two parties” and 
should not be undertaken “absent some explicit evidence of 
congressional intent.”69 
The Supreme Court is free to overturn lower court decisions, but 
 
 62. Id. at 226. 
 63. Id. 
 64. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). 
 65. Id. at 227 (citing Cady, 40 S.E.C. at 912). 
 66. Id. at 231–32. Although Chiarella was a stranger to the companies whose shares he 
purchased, he was arguably an agent for the printing company. The SEC never advanced that 
theory, and thus, the court declined to address it. In his dissent, Chief Justice Burger stated that 
Chiarella was not operating in an arm’s-length transaction, because he had essentially stolen 
inside information. Id. at 239–40 (Burger, C. J., dissenting). Justice Burger would read § 10(b) 
and Rule 10b-5 to mean that a person who has “misappropriated nonpublic information has an 
absolute duty to disclose that information or to refrain from trading.” Id. (Brennan, J., 
concurring). It would take 20 years for the Supreme Court to recognize the misappropriation 
theory in United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997). 
 67. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 232 (1980). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 233. 
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here, the Court did not even acknowledge the Second Circuit’s 
finding in Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. that Congress did indeed intend to 
ensure equal access to information when it passed the Securities and 
Exchange Act.70 Considering the Second Circuit generally handles 
most of the insider trading cases, it was odd to ignore a finding 
regarding insider trading as clear as this: “[s]uch inequities based 
upon unequal access to knowledge should not be shrugged off as 
inevitable in our way of life, or, in view of the congressional concern 
in the area, remain uncorrected.”71 Nevertheless, the Court found 
Chiarella had violated no law and thus, reversed his conviction. 
The Chiarella opinion was written by Justice Powell, who was 
appointed to the bench in 1972 when he was sixty-four, and was 
already a prominent corporate lawyer, as well as a former director of 
eleven major corporations.72 Shortly before his appointment, he had 
written a letter to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, entitled “Attack 
of the American Free Enterprise System,” in which he warned of the 
“present assault” on the enterprise system by communists, leftists, 
and even voices “from the perfectly respectable elements of society: 
the college campus, the pulpit, the media, the intellectual and literary 
journals, the arts and sciences, and from politicians.”73 As a fierce 
advocate of free enterprise, Powell likely considered “fairness 
theory” to be in conflict with the free market ideals he championed. 
3.  Dirks v. SEC: Creating the Standard for Tipper/Tippee Liability 
The third major insider trading case, and widely considered the 
landmark decision in this area, was Dirks v. SEC, also written by 
Justice Powell. The facts in Dirks were extremely unusual because 
they involved massive corporate fraud.74 In 1973, Raymond Dirks, a 
market analyst, received material nonpublic information from Ronald 
Secrist, a former officer of Equity Funding of America (“Equity”), 
 
 70. SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 851–52 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. 
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). 
 71. Id. 
 72. Linda Greenhouse, Lewis Powell, Crucial Centrist Justice, Dies at 90, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 
26, 1998), http://www.nytimes.com/1998/08/26/us/lewis-powell-crucial-centrist-justice-dies-at 
-90.html?pagewanted=all. 
 73. Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Confidential Memorandum: Attack of American Free Enterprise 
Systems, PBS (Aug. 23, 1971), http://www.pbs.org/wnet/supremecourt/personality/sources 
_document13.html (“The memo was written two months before President Nixon nominated him 
to the Supreme Court. The memo is credited with inspiring the founding of many conservative 
think tanks, including the Heritage Foundation, the Cato Institute and the Manhattan Institute.”). 
 74. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 649 (1983). 
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that Equity’s assets were vastly overstated due to widespread fraud 
within the company.75 Secrist stated that various regulatory agencies 
had failed to act, despite charges made by other employees, and he 
wanted Dirks both to verify the fraud and to disclose it publicly.76 
Dirks investigated Equity and found lower level employees who 
admitted the fraud.77 Although neither Dirks nor his firm owned any 
shares of Equity, some of his firm’s clients did. Dirks discussed his 
findings openly with them, and they sold their shares worth more 
than $16 million, thereby avoiding substantial losses.78 
Dirks urged the Wall Street Journal to write a story on the fraud 
allegations, but the bureau chief did not believe such massive fraud 
was possible and feared publishing a story that might be libelous.79 
Shortly thereafter, Equity’s share price fell from $26 to $15, and 
California insurance authorities discovered the fraud.80 
The SEC found that Dirks had aided and abetted violations of 
§ 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 by repeating the allegations of fraud to 
members of the investment community who later sold their shares.81 
Although Dirks played an important role in exposing the fraud,82 the 
SEC censured him because he gave material nonpublic information 
about Equity to his clients, knowing that they would trade on it.83 
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
affirmed. Judge J. Skelly Wright held that anyone who receives 
material nonpublic information from an insider retains the fiduciary 
duty to disclose before trading.84 Alternatively, Judge Wright found 
that, as an employee of a broker-dealer, Dirks had violated his 
obligations to the SEC and to the public, which were completely 
independent of any obligations he acquired from Secrist’s tip.85 
But at the Supreme Court, Justice Powell rejected Judge 
Wright’s reasoning as essentially the same arguments the Court had 
 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 649–50. 
 80. Id. at 650. 
 81. Id. at 651. 
 82. Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d 824, 829 (1982) (“Largely thanks to Dirks, one of the most 
infamous cases of fraud in recent memory was uncovered and exposed, while the record shows 
that the SEC repeatedly missed opportunities to investigate Equity Funding.”). 
 83. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 651. 
 84. Id. at 652 (citing Dirks, 681 F.2d at 839). 
 85. Id. 
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previously rejected in Chiarella.86 The Court again rejected the 
SEC’s theory that the antifraud provisions of the Securities Act 
require “equal information” among all traders.87 In fact, Powell 
intended to establish a carve-out for market analysts,88 claiming that 
imposing a duty on analysts to disclose or abstain could inhibit them, 
and that even the SEC recognized that analysts were necessary for a 
healthy market.89 According to Powell, analysts routinely “ferret out” 
and evaluate information they receive by meeting with corporate 
officers and other insiders, and then determine the value of a 
corporation’s security.90 The analysts’ judgments are then made 
available to clients of the firm through newsletters, but, given the 
nature of the information and the markets themselves, it would be 
impossible to make the information available simultaneously to all of 
the stockholders or the general public.91 
At the same time, Powell knew a ban on insider trading was 
essential; without it, corporate insiders would trade information for 
cash or give it to the “stereotypical golfing buddy.”92 But he did not 
trust the SEC to create the legal boundaries.93 He contended that the 
duty to disclose advocated by the SEC would have no limiting 
principle, and in a footnote he observed “[w]ithout legal limitations, 
 
 86. Id. at 656. 
 87. Id. at 657. 
 88. Professor Adam Pritchard has researched Justice Powell’s life and writings extensively, 
including unpublished notes and dictations to his clerks, to better understand the Justice’s internal 
process. Pritchard stated: “Powell’s experience as a corporate lawyer had left him with definite 
views on the direction that the securities laws should take. In contrast to his reputation as a swing 
vote in constitutional cases, Powell had profoundly conservative views on the proper scope of the 
federal securities laws, and he pushed the Court toward holdings consistent with those views.” 
A.C. Pritchard, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., and the Counterrevolution in the Federal Securities 
Laws, 52 DUKE L.J. 841, 845 (2003). 
 89. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 658. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 658–59. One can’t help but wonder how applicable that assessment is today, when 
information is released to the public with the click of a mouse, let alone in light of high-frequency 
trading that occurs within microseconds, literally millionths of a second. In addition, Professor 
Langevoort has questioned the value of analysts as applied to different investors in the market: 
“[I]ntuition suggests that information generated by such multiservice firms will first find its way 
to the firm’s own trading desks and its institutional clients, and only be filtered along to retail 
customers after most of the opportunity for an informational trading advantage has disappeared.” 
Donald C. Langevoort, Investment Analysts and the Law of Insider Trading, 76 VA. L. REV. 
1023, 1026 (1990). In fact, in 2000 the SEC promulgated Regulation FD, which requires 
simultaneous disclosure of information. 17 C.F.R. § 243.100 (2016). 
 92. A.C. Pritchard, Dirks and the Genesis of Personal Benefit, 68 SMU L. REV. 857, 861 
(2015). Professor Pritchard’s insight comes from Justice Powell’s notes to his clerk, James 
Browning, regarding drafting the opinion, as well as memoranda for meetings with other justices. 
 93. Id. 
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market participants are forced to rely on the reasonableness of the 
SEC’s litigation strategy, but that can be hazardous, as the facts of 
this case make plain.”94 
In the end, Justice Powell held that liability for insider trading 
must be based on the insider’s (tipper’s) breach of fiduciary duty, 
which required that the tipper receive a “personal benefit,” either 
directly or indirectly, from the disclosure.95 Further, because a 
tippee’s liability was derivative of the tipper’s liability, there would 
be no liability for the tippee if the tipper received no personal 
benefit.96 Lower courts were instructed to focus on objective criteria, 
such as a pecuniary gain or a reputational benefit that would translate 
into future earnings, which could be inferred by objective facts and 
circumstances.97 In addition to these quid pro quo types of 
relationships, a breach of duty could arise when an insider “makes a 
gift” of material nonpublic information to a “trading relative or 
friend.”98 There, it would “resemble trading by the insider himself 
followed by a gift of the profits to the recipient.”99 Because Secrist, 
the insider who tipped Dirks, was motivated by the desire to expose 
the fraud and received no personal benefit, Dirks inherited no 
liability, and thus, his conviction was reversed.100 
4.  United States v. O’Hagan: The Misappropriation Theory 
The fourth major insider trading case was United States v. 
O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997). This case established the 
“misappropriation theory” that Justice Burger had contemplated in 
Chiarella.101 O’Hagan was a partner at a law firm that was hired to 
represent Grand Metropolitan for a potential tender offer for the 
common stock of the Pillsbury Company.102 Although O’Hagan did 
not work on the offer, he was aware of it, and he used material 
nonpublic information he acquired through his firm to trade in call 
 
 94. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664 n.24. Powell no doubt valued Dirks’ investigation into the alleged 
fraud, and likely considered the SEC’s action to be misguided, because he believed Dirks’ goal 
was to expose fraud, not to profit from inside information. 
 95. Id. at 662. 
 96. Id. at 664. 
 97. Id. at 663–64. 
 98. Id. at 664. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 667. 
 101. See United States v. Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222, 240 (1980) (Burger, J., dissenting). 
 102. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 647 (1997). 
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options and shares, making a profit of more than $4.3 million.103 
The SEC indicted O’Hagan for defrauding his law firm and its 
client by using material nonpublic information for his own trading 
purposes.104 In addition, O’Hagan used the profits to conceal his 
previous embezzlement and conversion of unrelated client trust 
funds.105 O’Hagan was convicted of violations of § 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5.106 
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed all of the 
convictions, holding that liability under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 
could not be grounded on the basis of misappropriating material 
nonpublic information he received through his firm, effectively 
rejecting the “misappropriation theory.”107 
The Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit and held that 
criminal liability under § 10(b) could indeed be based on the 
misappropriation theory.108 It reasoned that because the statute 
proscribed using any deceptive device in connection with the 
purchase or sale of securities in contravention of SEC Rules, it did 
not confine its coverage merely to deception of a purchaser or seller 
of securities.109 While the classical theory of a Rule 10b-5 violation 
is based on the fiduciary duty that corporate insiders owe to their 
shareholders,110 the misappropriation theory holds that a person 
commits securities fraud when he “misappropriates” material 
nonpublic information for trading purposes, “in breach of a duty 
owed to the source of the information.”111 
The court explained that under this theory, when a fiduciary 
breaches a duty of loyalty and confidentiality to the principal by 
trading on material nonpublic information for his own self-interest 
without disclosing it, he “defrauds the principal of the exclusive use 
 
 103. Id. at 648. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 648–49. 
 107. Id. at 649. 
 108. Id. at 649–50. The Court observed in a footnote that twice before it had been presented 
with the same question: first, in Chiarella, where the jury had not received instructions regarding 
misappropriation, thus the court declined to address it; and second, in United States v. Carpenter, 
484 U.S. 19, 24 (1987), where the court was evenly divided on misappropriation theory, partly 
because it was such an unusual case—the misappropriated information did not come from a 
company dealing in securities, but from the Wall Street Journal. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 650 n.4. 
 109. Id. at 651. 
 110. Id. at 651–52 (citing Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228). 
 111. Id. at 652 (emphasis added). 
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of that information.”112 The court reasoned that the two theories were 
complementary, as each addressed efforts to capitalize on nonpublic 
information through securities trading.113 
Commentators have noted that Powell’s opinions in Chiarella 
and Dirks were based on the common law of deceit, whereas 
Ginsburg’s opinion in O’Hagan drew on the common law of 
agency.114 But the broad scope of the misappropriation theory filled a 
gap left by the classical theory, which otherwise would have 
“severely undermine[d] the policy interests served by prohibitions 
against insider trading.”115 
C.  Recent Cases: Interpreting the Dirks Standard 
1.  SEC v. Obus: Expanding Tipper/Tippee Liability 
In 2012, the Second Circuit arguably expanded insider trading 
liability in SEC v. Obus when it reversed a summary judgment ruling 
against the SEC.116 Strickland then had a conversation with his 
college friend, Peter Black, a hedge fund analyst, about 
SunSource.117 Black told his boss, Nelson Obus, about the pending 
acquisition, and Obus later purchased about five percent of 
SunSource’s outstanding common stock for $4.75 per share.118 
Eleven days later, the acquisition was publicly announced and the 
price jumped to $9.50, representing a profit of $1.3 million for 
 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. A.C. Pritchard, United States v. O’Hagan: Agency Law and Justice Powell’s Legacy for 
the Law of Insider Trading, 78 B.U. L. REV. 13, 17 (1998). 
 115. Id. Professor Pritchard further observed that Justice Powell petitioned his fellow justices 
to grant certiorari in United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986), the earlier case 
based the misappropriation theory. Id. at 32. The Second Circuit had been developing the theory 
through three cases, and Powell wanted to invalidate it, but by the time Carpenter reached the 
court, he had retired, and the decision resulted in a 4-4 split. O’Hagan, written by Justice 
Ginsberg, settled the matter in favor of the misappropriation theory. Unlike Justice Powell, 
Justice Ginsburg had no corporate law experience. Before becoming a Circuit Judge, Justice 
Ginsburg “was the director of the Women’s Rights Project for the ACLU and won five of the six 
major cases on gender equality she argued before the Supreme Court including Reed v. Reed 
(1973).” John Fox, Biographies of the Robes: Ruth Bader Ginsburg, PBS, http://www.pbs.org 
/wnet/supremecourt/future/robes_ginsburg.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2016). 
 116. SEC v. Obus, 693 F.3d 276, 293 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 117. Id. at 280. The contents of the conversation were disputed. Id. The defendants 
maintained that Strickland asked Black about Sunsource’s management as part of his due 
diligence, whereas the SEC alleged that Strickland tipped Black with material nonpublic 
information regarding the pending acquisition. Id. The Second Circuit deemed the disputed 
conversations “genuine questions of fact,” that warranted reversal of the summary judgment. Id. 
at 293. 
 118. Id. at 280–82. 
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Obus’s fund.119 
The Second Circuit held that the District Court erred when it 
relied on an internal investigation at Strickland’s firm to determine 
whether he had tipped Black in breach of a fiduciary duty, because 
the investigation’s conclusions were contradicted by other evidence, 
making it unreliable.120 It was a factual dispute, which therefore 
required a jury to make a finding of fact.121 Further, the court held 
that the undisputed fact that Strickland and Black were college 
friends was sufficient to “send to the jury the question of whether 
Strickland received a benefit from tipping Black.”122 The same 
evidence created a question of fact as to “whether Strickland 
intentionally tipped Black.”123 Moreover, the court held that it was 
sufficient for a jury to conclude that Strickland “intentionally or 
recklessly revealed material non-public information to Black, 
knowing that he was making a gift of information Black was likely to 
use for securities trading purposes.”124 
Taken together, the court’s holdings regarding the college 
friendship between Strickland and Black may have led prosecutors to 
believe that evidence of a friendship, college or otherwise, would 
satisfy the “personal benefit” element required for tipper liability. 
2.  United States v. Newman: Reducing Exposure 
In 2014, the Second Circuit took another look at tipper/tippee 
liability in United States v. Newman, and rejected the notion that a 
tipper’s personal benefit could be inferred from a personal 
relationship between the tipper and tippee, without more proof. 
The facts of this case were complicated because they involved 
several degrees of tipping from insiders at Dell and NVIDIA 
regarding earnings numbers in advance of their public release.125 The 
information came through a tipping chain of three to four analysts, 
who then passed the information on to hedge fund managers 
Newman and Chiasson.126 They both traded on the tips and made $4 
 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 291. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. This line of the opinion was likely the most troubling for those working on Wall 
Street. It could be interpreted to mean that any conversation among friends regarding any security 
could lead to liability on the ground that one party made a gift of inside information. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 443 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 126. Id. 
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million and $68 million, respectively, in profits for their funds.127 
Notably, because Newman and Chiasson were several steps removed 
from the tippers, there was no evidence that either was aware of the 
source of the inside information.128 Nevertheless, the Government 
argued that Newman and Chiasson were criminally liable for insider 
trading because, “as sophisticated traders, they must have known that 
information was disclosed by insiders in breach of a fiduciary duty, 
and not for any legitimate corporate purpose.”129 They were 
convicted and sentenced to fifty-four months in prison, followed by a 
year of supervised release, in addition to fines and forfeitures of up 
to $5 million.130 
On appeal, Newman and Chiasson argued that the jury 
instructions were erroneous and, further, that there was insufficient 
evidence to support their convictions.131 The court noted that 
although the Government conceded that tippee liability required 
proof of a personal benefit to the tipper, it claimed that it was not 
required to prove that the appellants knew that insiders at Dell and 
NVIDIA received a personal benefit in order to be found guilty of 
insider trading.132 Instead, “consistent with the district court’s 
instruction,” it claimed it merely needed to prove that the 
“defendants traded on material nonpublic information they knew 
insiders had disclosed in breach of a duty of confidentiality . . . .”133 
In support, the Government cited Dirks for the “proposition that the 
Supreme Court only required that the ‘tippee know that the tipper 
disclosed information in breach of a duty.’”134 In addition, the 
Government cited dicta in other cases where the court described 
elements of tippee liability “without specifically stating that the 
Government must prove that the tippee knew that the corporate 
insider who disclosed confidential information did so for his own 
personal benefit.”135 
The court rejected the Government’s argument. It explained, 
“[b]y selectively parsing this dictum, the Government seeks to revive 
 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 443–44. 
 130. Id. at 444–45. 
 131. Id. at 445. 
 132. Id. at 447 (emphasis added). 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. (citing Dirks, 463 U.S. at 600). 
 135. Id. 
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the absolute bar on tippee trading that the Supreme Court explicitly 
rejected in Dirks.”136 The court observed that the Government’s 
“overreliance” on the court’s prior dicta merely highlighted the 
“doctrinal novelty” of its recent insider trading prosecutions, which 
were “increasingly targeted at remote tippees many levels removed 
from corporate insiders.”137 Prior cases, by contrast, generally 
involved tippees who “directly participated in the tipper’s breach 
(and therefore had knowledge of the tipper’s disclosure for personal 
benefit)” or tippees who were “explicitly apprised of the tipper’s gain 
by an intermediary tippee.”138 The court could not find a single case 
in which tippees “as remote as” the appellants had been held 
criminally liable for insider trading.139 
The court acknowledged it had “not yet been presented with the 
question of whether the tippee’s knowledge of a tipper’s breach 
requires knowledge of the tipper’s personal benefit,” but stated that 
the answer “follows naturally from Dirks.”140 For insider trading 
liability, the insider’s disclosure of confidential information alone is 
not a breach.141 Therefore, without establishing that “the tippee 
knows of the personal benefit received by the insider in exchange for 
the disclosure,” the Government cannot meet its burden of showing 
that the tippee knew of a breach.142 Specifically addressing the issue 
of the benefit that may be inferred from a personal relationship, the 
court stated, “such an inference is impermissible in the absence of 
proof of a meaningfully close personal relationship that generates an 
exchange that is objective, consequential, and represents at least a 
potential gain of a pecuniary or similarly valuable nature.”143 
Thus, the court reversed the convictions. The Government 
petitioned for an en banc review, but the Circuit denied it.144 The 
Government then filed a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court, but 
was again denied.145 
 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 448. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 447. 
 141. Id. at 448. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 452. 
 144. United States v. Newman, Nos. 13-1837(L), 13-1917(Con), 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 
5788, at *4 (2d Cir. Apr. 3, 2015). 
 145. United States v. Newman, No. 15-137, 2015 U.S. LEXIS 6104, at *1 (Oct. 5, 2015). 
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D.  Post Newman Circuit Split 
Before the Supreme Court took up Salman, some commentators 
speculated that there may have been a circuit split created by the 
opinions of Judge Jed Rakoff.146 Although he regularly sits in the 
District Court of the Second Circuit, he recently sat by designation 
on the Ninth Circuit and he alone may have created a circuit split.147 
In the Second Circuit, Judge Rakoff was bound by Newman, but in 
the Ninth Circuit he was not. 
1.  S.D.N.Y.: United States v. Gupta July 2015 
Here, Rajat Gupta moved to vacate his sentence and the 
judgment against him arising from his 2012 conviction of conspiracy 
and securities fraud, based on the recent decision in Newman.148 
Gupta had been on the board of directors of Goldman Sachs, and 
there was ample evidence he had tipped his close business associate 
with material nonpublic information on several occasions, following 
which, his associate traded on the information.149 Gupta had argued 
that Newman required that a tipper (here Gupta) receive from his 
tippee a “quid pro quo” in the form of “a potential gain of a 
pecuniary or similarly valuable nature.”150 The court first 
distinguished Newman, noting that Newman was a remote tippee, 
whereas Gupta was a tipper.151 Next, the court reiterated the standard 
it had repeatedly made clear: “a tipper is liable for securities fraud if 
he takes sensitive market information provided to him in a fiduciary 
capacity and exploits it for some personal benefit.”152 The court 
noted that this was “precisely how the jury was instructed” in his 
case, and Newman “in no way purports to change this fundamental 
concept.”153 
Then Judge Rakoff addressed the second holding in Newman, 
upon which Gupta primarily relied:154 
To the extent Dirks suggests that a personal benefit may be 
inferred from a personal relationship between the tipper and 
 
 146. Miller, supra note 19. 
 147. Id. 
 148. United States v. Gupta, 111 F. Supp. 3d 557 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). 
 149. Id. at 560–61. 
 150. Id. at 559. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 560. 
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tippee, where the tippee’s trades “resemble trading by the 
insider himself followed by a gift of the profits to the 
recipient,” we hold that such an inference is impermissible 
in the absence of proof of a meaningfully close personal 
relationship that generates an exchange that is objective, 
consequential, and represents at least a potential gain of a 
pecuniary or similarly valuable nature. In other words, as 
Judge Walker noted in Jiau, this requires evidence of “a 
relationship between the insider and the recipient that 
suggests a quid pro quo from the latter, or an intention to 
benefit the latter.155 
Judge Rakoff pointed out that the use of the word “or” in the last 
sentence indicated that “a tipper’s intention to benefit the tippee is 
sufficient to satisfy the benefit requirement so far as the tipper is 
concerned, and no quid pro quo is required.”156 On the other hand, 
Judge Rakoff clarified, “so far as a remote tippee’s knowledge of that 
intent is concerned, the jury, according to the Newman court, cannot 
infer such knowledge from the mere fact that the remote tippee knew 
that the tipper and direct tippee were friends.”157 Rather, he 
explained, “to warrant such an inference in such circumstances, there 
must be evidence of a ‘meaningfully close personal relationship that 
generates an exchange that is objective, consequential, and represents 
at least a potential gain of a pecuniary or similarly valuable 
nature.’”158 Judge Rakoff concluded that, in any event, the proof at 
trial easily satisfied “even Gupta’s view of Newman.”159 Thus, 
Gupta’s motion was denied in its entirety.160 
2.  Ninth Circuit: United States v. Salman July 2015 
Here again, the element of personal benefit was the crucial 
factor in deciding the case. In 2003, Bassam Yacoub Salman’s sister 
Susan became engaged to Maher Kara, an investment banker in 
 
 155. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. The “friendship from college” argument was put forth by the Government in 
Newman, perhaps based on success of that argument in Obus, but the Newman court invalidated it 
as insufficient. The standard the Newman court set forth was more rigorous, as it added the 
requirement that the tippee, no matter how remote, know of the personal benefit received by the 
original tipper. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at 561. 
 160. Id. 
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Citigroup’s healthcare group.161 Over the course of the engagement, 
the Kara family and the Salman family became very close.162 In 
particular, Salman and Michael Kara, Maher’s older brother, became 
close friends.163 Michael had an undergraduate degree in chemistry 
and often helped his younger brother, Maher, understand scientific 
concepts relevant to his work in the healthcare and biotechnology 
sectors.164 Between 2004 and 2007, Maher regularly and knowingly 
disclosed to Michael material nonpublic information about upcoming 
mergers and acquisitions, on which Michael traded.165 At the same 
time, Michael shared the information with Salman and encouraged 
him to “mirror-image” his trading activity.166 Salman did so, but 
instead of trading through his own account, he arranged for a series 
of transfers, ultimately into the account of his wife’s sister and her 
husband, Bayyouk, and Salman would split the profits with them.167 
From 2004 to 2007, the account grew from $396,000 to $2.1 
million.168 
Salman, like Newman, was a remote tippee. Under the Newman 
standard of the Second Circuit, in order to prosecute Salman, the 
Government would need to prove that Salman (1) knew that Maher 
was the tipper and that he breached his fiduciary duty to Citigroup, 
(2) knew that Maher received a personal benefit from doing so, and 
(3) traded on the information anyway.169 
The Government had presented evidence that Salman knew that 
Maher was the tipper and had breached his fiduciary duty in tipping 
the information.170 In addition, the Government had presented 
evidence that Maher and Michael Kara “enjoyed a close and 
mutually beneficial relationship,” which would satisfy the Newman 
requirements.171 For instance, Michael helped pay for Maher’s 
 
 161. United States v. Salman, 792 F.3d 1087, 1088–89 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 162. Id. at 1089. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 447 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 170. Salman, 792 F.3d at 1089. In fact, Michael pleaded guilty and testified for the 
government that he told Salman, directly, that the information was coming from Maher. Id. On 
another occasion, when Michael saw papers regarding their trades strewn about Salman’s office, 
Michael became angry, and Salman agreed that they had to “protect” Maher and promised to 
shred the papers. Id. 
 171. Id. 
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college, stood in for their deceased father at Maher’s wedding, and 
coached Maher on science, so that he could succeed at Citigroup.172 
Maher loved his brother Michael and gave him information “to 
benefit him” and “fulfill whatever needs he had.”173 On one occasion 
when Michael asked for inside information because he “owed 
somebody,” Maher initially offered cash, but when Michael refused 
it, he eventually “gave him a tip about an upcoming acquisition 
instead.”174 
Moreover, the Government presented evidence that Salman was 
aware of the Kara brothers’ close relationship, such as when Salman 
attended Maher’s wedding and saw him weep when Michael gave a 
toast, describing Maher as his “mentor” and “one of the most 
generous human beings he knows.”175 Lastly, there was ample 
evidence that Salman traded on the information.176 
Salman had argued that under Newman, “evidence of a 
friendship or familial relationship between a tipper and tippee, 
standing alone, is insufficient to demonstrate that the tipper received 
a benefit.”177 Salman focused on the language “indicating that the 
exchange of information must include ‘at least a potential gain of a 
pecuniary or similarly valuable nature,’” which Salman interpreted 
as referring to the benefit received by the tipper.178 Salman argued 
that because there was no evidence that Maher received “any such 
tangible benefit in exchange for the inside information” or that 
Salman “knew of any such benefit,” the Government failed to “carry 
its burden.”179 
The court responded firmly: “To the extent Newman can be read 
to go so far, we decline to follow it.”180 Although at first blush, these 
 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. at 1090. 
 176. Id. at 1089. 
 177. Id. at 1093. 
 178. Id. (quoting United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 452 (2d Cir. 2014)). 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. In what might be considered a jab at the Newman court, Judge Rakoff began with the 
same three words, “to the extent,” the Newman court used when it arguably added an evidentiary 
requirement to the Dirks holding: “To the extent Dirks suggests that a personal benefit may be 
inferred from a personal relationship between the tipper and tippee, where the tippee’s trades 
‘resemble trading by the insider himself followed by a gift of the profits to the recipient,’ see 
Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 664 (1983), we hold that such an inference is impermissible in the 
absence of proof of a meaningfully close personal relationship that generates an exchange that is 
objective, consequential, and represents at least a potential gain of a pecuniary or similarly 
valuable nature.” United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 452 (2d Cir. 2014). 
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may sound like fighting words (and the Supreme Court must have 
thought so when it granted certiorari), Judge Rakoff followed that 
sentence with the weight of binding precedent: “Doing so would 
require us to depart from the clear holding of Dirks that the element 
of breach of fiduciary duty is met where an ‘insider makes a gift of 
confidential information to a trading relative or friend.’”181 If 
Salman’s theory were accepted and the evidence found to be 
insufficient, Rakoff continued, then an insider would be free to 
disclose material nonpublic information to her relatives, and they 
would be free to trade on it, as long as she asked for no tangible 
compensation in return.182 As evidenced by Justice Powell’s internal 
notes, this was not the result intended by Dirks.183 The court held that 
the evidence was more than sufficient to convict Salman.184 
III.  CRITIQUE OF EXISTING LAW  
A.  Is Market Efficiency Still a Valid Argument? 
Justice Powell was concerned with protecting market analysts 
from overzealous SEC prosecution.185 He argued that even the SEC 
agreed that analysts provided a valuable service to the efficient 
functioning of the markets.186 According to the SEC paper Justice 
Powell was referencing, the “value to the entire market of [analysts’] 
efforts cannot be gainsaid; market efficiency in pricing is 
significantly enhanced by [their] initiatives to ferret out and analyze 
information, and thus the analyst’s work redounds to the benefit of 
all investors.”187 
But in light of modern technology, where nearly unlimited 
information is readily available to anyone with an internet 
connection, it is worth asking if analysts’ contributions continue to 
 
 181. Salman, 792 F.3d at 1093 (quoting Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664). 
 182. Id. at 1094. 
 183. Pritchard, supra note 92, at 861 (noting that Justice Powell, who wrote Dirks, wanted to 
prevent insiders from tipping the “stereotypical golfing buddy”). 
 184. Salman, 792 F.3d at 1094. 
 185. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664 n.24 (1983) (“Without legal limitations, market participants are 
forced to rely on the reasonableness of the SEC’s litigation strategy, but that can be hazardous, as 
the facts of this case make plain.”). 
 186. Id. at 658 (“Imposing a duty to disclose or abstain solely because a person knowingly 
receives material nonpublic information from an insider and trades on it could have an inhibiting 
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 187. Id. at 658 n.17. 
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provide a benefit to all investors.188 
In exchange for this benefit, the Court essentially created a 
carve-out for market analysts.189 But this policy has meant that 
analysts (and their firms and clients) can reap the benefits of trading 
on material nonpublic information, as long as the government cannot 
prove that the tipper obtained a personal benefit and that the tippee 
knew of the benefit. For example, the remote tippees in Newman 
arguably knew that they had inside information regarding corporate 
earnings before they were publicly released in a report.190 Newman 
and others traded on the insiders’ tips and made over $70 million for 
their hedge funds.191 Their convictions were reversed because the 
government did not prove that the tippers received a personal benefit 
or that the tippees knew of such a benefit.192 It would seem that the 
lesson from this case is quite simple: the legal way to beat the market 
and succeed in the financial sector is to obtain material nonpublic 
information from corporate executives, share the information within 
a circle of friends without telling them the source, and ensure that the 
friends do the same. As long as each person trades on information 
obtained by someone else, no one can be prosecuted. Considering the 
current debate on income inequality, it is worth asking if this policy 
is still consistent with our society’s values. 
If, on the other hand, a market analyst conducts extensive 
research, arrives at certain conclusions about a company’s financial 
health, and profits handsomely by trading on those conclusions 
without receiving material nonpublic information from an insider, 
such actions are consistent with the core American ideal that hard 
work will be rewarded. In such a case, it would be considered 
unthinkable (or worse, communist) to expect the analyst to hand over 
the fruits of the research to a trading counterparty in order to achieve 
information parity. Market analysts are constantly striving for an 
informational advantage over their counterparties by collecting and 
analyzing publicly available data to “take advantage of pricing 
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inefficiencies in [a] company’s securities.”193 
One technique used to gather information is “channel checking”, 
which can take many forms, such as conversations with supply-side 
sources or franchise outlets, aggregation of shipping data, or even 
counting the cars in a Best Buy parking lot.194 Analysts can run into a 
gray area, however, when they combine channel checks with 
nonpublic information obtained from insiders that is ostensibly non-
material.195 Because the definition of materiality is so broad as to 
include any information a reasonable investor would consider before 
choosing to invest, analysts’ conversations with corporate insiders 
can easily reveal information that later turns out to be “material.”196 
This could leave the analyst with the dilemma of either scrapping all 
of their research or running the risk of being prosecuted. Perhaps it is 
unrealistic to expect analysts to conduct vigorous research and never 
receive material nonpublic information, and thus the carve-out is an 
appropriate protective measure. 
B.  The SEC Pursues Fairness, Despite the Supreme Court’s Explicit 
Fiduciary Requirement 
As a general rule, from the beginning of the SEC, its regulations 
have been designed to promote full disclosure to all investors.197 This 
policy played out in 2000 with the passage of SEC Regulation FD 
(Fair Disclosure), which requires that issuers of securities who 
disclose any material nonpublic information to one person, must 
publicly disclose the information “simultaneously, in the case of an 
intentional disclosure,” or “promptly, in the case of a non-intentional 
disclosure.”198 With full disclosure, market participants should be 
fully informed, and therefore, the pricing of securities should reflect 
all of the publicly available information.199 Given this basic premise, 
a companion theory has arisen that investors should have equal 
access to information,200 Under this theory of equal access, “[t]rading 
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securities on the basis of material nonpublic information gives the 
trader an unfair advantage over other investors that runs counter to 
the premise of federal securities law.”201 
Although this theory of equal access and fairness dates back (at 
least) to In re Cady, Roberts & Co.,202 it also appears to have 
motivated many of the SEC’s recent actions, despite the Supreme 
Court’s “explicit dicta that fiduciary principles underlie the offense 
of insider trading.”203 An increasing number of lower courts ignored 
the fiduciary dicta “when it foreclose[d] liability against a defendant 
who ha[d] traded securities based on wrongfully obtained 
information.”204 Indeed, lower courts may have been emboldened by 
observing the Supreme Court’s willingness to stretch fiduciary 
principles in order to obtain policy goals, as some contend occurred 
in Chiarella, Dirks, and O’Hagan.205 Given that lower courts discard 
fiduciary principles with increasing regularity, the current framework 
of insider trading liability is producing inconsistent results. 
Professor Nagy has recommended that when examining 
gratuitous tipping, courts go beyond Dirks and consider the 
misappropriation theory, Regulation FD, and state court decisions 
that “construe breaches of the duty of loyalty to include not only self-
dealing but also other actions taken in bad faith.”206 Professor Kim 
suggested that considering insider trading as a form of private 
corruption would be an improvement on the fiduciary duty model.207 
When deciding Salman, the Court should consider revisiting the 
fiduciary test created in Dirks. 
C.  Beware the Ambitious, Aggressive Prosecutor 
While some government prosecutions may be motivated by the 
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equal access theory, which the Supreme Court has explicitly 
rejected,208 others may be motivated by personal recognition and 
career advancement. For example, in 2012, U.S. Attorney Preet 
Bharara, whose office prosecuted Newman, among many other high 
profile cases, was named by Time magazine as one of “The 100 Most 
Influential People in the World.”209 In 2011, Reed Brodsky rose to 
prominence as the lead prosecutor in the trial of former Goldman 
Sachs Director Rajat Gupta, and in 2016 he is making headlines for 
joining the defense team for Kaye Scholer LLP partner Evan 
Greebal, who is charged with securities fraud along with “pharma 
bad boy” Martin Shkreli.210 
Many celebrated Attorney Generals have parlayed their position 
into powerful elected posts, including New York Governors Andrew 
Cuomo, Elliot Spitzer and Thomas Dewey and California Governors 
Jerry Brown, George Deukmejian, Pat Brown and Earl Warren. It is 
not unreasonable to surmise that an aspiring government prosecutor 
might bend the law to take down a high profile Wall Street player. In 
the new Showtime television series Billions, where a federal 
prosecutor pursues his nemesis, a hedge fund manager, both 
characters are equally motivated by personal gain.211 The concern of 
prosecutorial overreach in part led to Justice Powell’s formulation of 
the fiduciary duty requirement in Dirks.212 In reviewing Salman, the 
court should clarify the law so that prosecutors cannot stretch the law 
to achieve a desirable outcome. 
IV.  PROPOSAL: REVISIT DIRKS AND NEWMAN 
While it might be tempting to suggest that the Court create an 
entirely new standard for insider trading violations when it decides 
Salman, it is unlikely the Court would do so. Instead, the Court could 
keep the basic framework, which is based on fiduciary duty, but 
reduce one of the necessary elements to a factor to be considered and 
 
 208. United States v. Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222, 232–33 (1980). 
 209. Viet Dinh, Time 100: The List: Preet Bharara, TIME (Apr. 18, 2012), http:// 
content.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,2111975_2111976_2112129,00.html. 
 210. Y. Peter Kang, Kaye Scholer Atty Taps Gupta Prosecutor in Shkreli Case, LAW360 
(Feb. 8, 2016, 10:44 PM ET), http://www.law360.com/securities/articles/756862. 
 211. Kai Ryssdal, Showtime’s “Billions” Pits Wealth Against Power, MARKETPLACE (Jan. 
14, 2016, 9:52 PM), http://www.marketplace.org/2016/01/12/life/billions. The show’s creators 
based the prosecutor on interviews with current AUSAs, one of whom gloated over his unbridled 
power. Id. 
 212. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 664 n.24 (1983); see supra note 185. 
Fall 2016] INSIDER TRADING LAW THAT WORKS 601 
eliminate another element entirely. First, the Court should change the 
personal benefit requirement established in Dirks to a personal 
benefit factor. The Court has done this before, when it rejected the 
strict two-pronged Aguilar-Spinelli test for assessing the value of an 
anonymous tip regarding criminal activity, and instead adopted a 
totality-of-the-circumstances test.213 
Second, the Court should eliminate the requirement established 
in Newman that the tippee must know of the tipper’s personal 
benefit. Instead, the Court should return to the fiduciary duty 
requirement before Dirks, where liability stemmed from the insider’s 
breach of fiduciary duty to the corporation, regardless of whether the 
insider obtained a personal benefit.214 While it is understandable that 
Justice Powell examined the personal benefit of the tipper to 
determine whether a tip constituted a breach of duty, it should be 
considered as an important factor in assessing a breach of duty, but 
not a dispositive one. This interpretation is arguably consistent with 
parts of Dirks, because Justice Powell gave such an open-ended, non-
exclusive set of examples of breach of fiduciary duty.215 To highlight 
the non-exclusive nature of the list of examples, certain words have 
been underlined: 
[T]o determine whether the disclosure itself “[deceives], 
[manipulates], or [defrauds]” shareholders, the initial 
inquiry is whether there has been a breach of duty by the 
insider. This requires courts to focus on objective criteria, 
i.e., whether the insider receives a direct or indirect 
personal benefit from the disclosure, such as a pecuniary 
gain or a reputational benefit that will translate into future 
earnings. There are objective facts and circumstances that 
often justify an inference. For example, there may be a 
relationship between the insider and the recipient that 
suggests a quid pro quo from the latter, or an intention to 
benefit the particular recipient. The elements of fiduciary 
duty and exploitation of nonpublic information also exist 
when an insider makes a gift of confidential information to 
a trading relative or friend. The tip and trade resemble 
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trading by the insider himself followed by a gift of the 
profits to the recipient.216 
The facts of Dirks were extremely unusual and Justice Powell 
created a test that yielded the result he desired in that case, but the 
result was inconsistent with the SEC’s goal of fairness. As Justice 
Blackmun wrote in his dissent in Dirks, “[i]t makes no difference to 
the shareholder whether the corporate insider gained or intended to 
gain personally from the transaction; the shareholder still has lost 
because of the insider’s misuse of nonpublic information.”217 
Blackmun stated that the majority engrafted a “special motivational 
requirement” on the fiduciary duty doctrine.218 Further, Blackmun 
disagreed with Powell’s “efficiency theory,” in which “the benefit 
conferred on society by Secrist’s and Dirks’ activities may be paid 
for with the losses caused to shareholders trading with Dirks’ 
clients.”219 
Blackmun interpreted the Court’s opinion to impose liability on 
tippees when they know or have reason to know that the information 
is material and nonpublic and was obtained through a breach of 
duty.220 Justice Brennan perhaps phrased the standard better in his 
concurrence in Chiarella: “a person violates § 10(b) whenever he 
improperly obtains or converts to his own benefit nonpublic 
information which he then uses in connection with the purchase or 
sale of securities.”221 As demonstrated below, this standard would 
yield results that align more closely with the SEC’s goal of fairness 
for all investors, without punishing analysts who work diligently and 
honestly to gain an informational advantage. 
Applying this standard to Dirks, Dirks’ censure would have been 
upheld. Dirks received material nonpublic information from Secrist 
regarding Equity’s fraud, and Dirks surely knew or should have 
known that Secrist, a former officer of the company, breached his 
duty in tipping the information.222 Dirks should have kept the 
information confident, but instead he shared it with his clients who 
immediately sold their shares, thereby avoiding great losses.223 Other 
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investors who did not have access to such inside information were 
not so lucky. This is precisely the kind of unfair advantage that led to 
the creation of the SEC.224 While it may be honorable that Dirks also 
helped to expose the fraud, it should not exempt him from liability 
for using inside information for personal gain.225 
Applying the standard to Chiarella, the “insider” who owed a 
duty to the company was Chiarella himself. As an employee of the 
print shop, he owed a duty to the print shop and its customers to keep 
confidential any information he learned in the course of his work. 
Without such a duty, every outside vendor from the cleaning staff to 
the lawyers structuring the acquisition would be free to use inside 
information for personal gain. The fact that Chiarella was clever 
enough to deduce the identities of the corporations involved in 
acquisitions should not have exempted him from liability. In 
addition, this standard would yield the same result in O’Hagan, 
because O’Hagan owed a duty to his law firm and to its client to 
keep the acquisition information confidential and not to use it for 
personal gain. 
Looking to Salman, Mr. Salman would certainly be liable under 
this standard because he clearly knew that he was receiving 
information about corporate acquisitions in advance of public 
announcements in breach of his brother-in-law’s brother’s duty to 
Citigroup to keep the information confidential.226 
Perhaps the most difficult application of this standard would be 
to Newman. The liability of all the tippees, no matter how remote, 
would depend on whether they knew or should have known that the 
information was material, nonpublic and obtained through a breach 
of duty. As mentioned in the discussion of the efficiency theory in 
the previous section, it is conceivable that an analyst would conduct 
research by speaking with corporate insiders, and in the course of the 
conversation, the insider might reveal material nonpublic 
information. Liability would then depend on whether the information 
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was tipped in breach of a duty. 
Evidence presented in Newman established that investor 
relations personnel routinely “leaked” earnings data in advance of 
quarterly earnings.227 For instance, the head of Investor Relations at 
Dell selectively disclosed financial information “to establish 
relationships with financial firms who might be in a position to buy 
Dell’s stock.”228 In such an example, the disclosure would be for the 
benefit of the corporation, and therefore it would not be a breach of 
duty, nor would it be improper for the tippee to obtain it. On the 
other hand, selectively leaking inside information, even to establish 
relationships with powerful finance firms, is in violation of 
Regulation FD, and it would be a breach of duty to the corporation to 
intentionally break a federal securities law. 
Additional evidence in Newman established that analysts 
“routinely estimate metrics such as revenue, gross margin, operating 
margin and earnings per share through legitimate financial modeling 
using publicly available information and educated assumptions about 
industry and company trends.”229 Further evidence showed that 
analysts “routinely solicited information from companies in order to 
check assumptions in their models in advance of earnings 
announcements.”230 For example, one of the tippees in the tipping 
chain testified that he frequently ran his model past internal relations 
departments and asked whether his assumptions were “too high or 
too low” or in the “ball park,” which suggested analysts routinely 
updated figures in advance of earnings announcements.231 If it is 
determined that such information was passed to analysts for a 
corporate benefit and did not constitute a breach of fiduciary duty, 
there would be no tippee liability. 
Newman would be an ideal case to consider a personal benefit 
factor in determining whether there was a breach of fiduciary duty. If 
a corporate insider received a personal benefit such as a payback or a 
job offer for disclosing information, then it would tend to be more 
likely it was a breach. But if the benefit accrued to the corporation, it 
would tend not to be a breach, especially if the insider revealed the 
information publicly in accordance with Regulation FD. 
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In applying the pre-Dirks standard to Newman, the result would 
be unclear. Because there was evidence on both sides of the question 
of whether there was a breach of duty when the information was 
tipped, it would require the jury to determine the facts, using the 
personal benefit as a factor, not a required element. 
V.  JUSTIFICATION FOR THE PROPOSAL 
The problem with the current standard under Dirks and Newman 
is that it is making it unreasonably difficult for the government to 
prosecute those who willfully use material nonpublic information 
obtained improperly. Mr. Salman, for instance, blatantly broke the 
law and attempted to hide his actions in another person’s brokerage 
account, but now he claims innocence and has appealed to the 
Supreme Court, based on Newman’s holding that the government 
must prove that the insider/tipper received a benefit from the tip and 
that he, as the remote tippee, knew of the benefit.232 By eliminating 
the personal benefit requirement from Dirks as well as Newman’s 
requirement that the tippee know of the tipper’s personal benefit, and 
instead using the personal benefit as a factor, not a requirement, the 
Court will align the judicial framework with the objective of the SEC 
to ensure fairness in the market system. In addition, this standard 
would not result in absolute information parity, which would punish 
market analysts for honest work. 
Further, this standard would comport with what lower courts are 
already doing, in terms of disregarding the fiduciary duty 
requirement. Courts are likely doing this because the current standard 
is unreasonably difficult for prosecutors to succeed, even when facts 
demonstrate obvious violations. By using the proposed standard, 
lower courts would be more likely to follow precedent, because they 
could successfully convict violators. This would result in more 
consistent application of the law throughout the country. 
Under the current standard, courts in the Second Circuit are 
bound by the stringent requirements of Newman, while courts 
elsewhere are not. Defendants with identical facts prosecuted in 
different circuits are subject to different interpretations of federal 
law, which is untenable. The current situation also makes it difficult 
for counsel to advise clients, and makes it easy for potential violators 
to craft defense strategies. 
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By implementing the new standard, the investing public would 
be encouraged to participate more fully in the markets, because there 
would be less concern that insiders can trade using an unfair 
advantage. This would lead to greater financial rewards for all 
market participants. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
When the Supreme Court reviews United States v. Salman this 
year, it should take the opportunity to revisit the personal benefit 
requirement created in the landmark insider trading case SEC v. 
Dirks, as well as the United States v. Newman requirement that the 
tippee must know of the tipper’s personal benefit. The Court should 
eliminate the knowledge requirement of Newman and change the 
personal benefit requirement of Dirks to a personal benefit factor. 
While it is a valuable factor for determining an insider’s breach of 
duty, it is not dispositive, and therefore, it should not be a required 
element of a fiduciary breach. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
